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THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE RESIDENT WHO PERFORMED THE SURGERY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF ANOTHER SURGEON SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the medical malpractice action against the resident who performed the surgery (Kent) should have been dismissed because the resident was acting under the supervision of another surgeon (Doak):

With respect to the appeal by Kent and the Kaleida Health defendants, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in denying that part of their motion (Kaleida motion) seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint and any cross-claims against Kent because Kent did not exercise independent medical judgment during the surgery. It is well settled that a ” ‘resident who assists a doctor during a medical procedure, and who does not exercise any independent medical judgment, cannot be held liable for malpractice so long as the doctor’s directions did not so greatly deviate from normal practice that the resident should be held liable for failing to intervene’ ” … , even where the resident ” ‘played an active role in [the plaintiff’s] procedure’ ” … . Kent and the Kaleida Health defendants met their burden on the Kaleida motion with respect to Kent by submitting evidence that plaintiff was Doak’s patient, Doak determined the surgery that was to be performed, and Doak directly supervised Kent during the facetectomy, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition … . Van Hook v Doak, 2024 NY Slip Op 02641, Fourth Dept 5-10-24

Practice Point: A resident who does not exercise independent medical judgment when performing surgery under the supervision of another surgeon cannot be sued for medical malpractice.

 

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