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PLAINTIFF’S ALLOWING HIS ATTACKER INTO HIS APARTMENT WAS AN INTERVENING ACT AND A SUPERSEDING PROXIMATE CAUSE WHICH RELIEVED THE BUILDING DEFENDANTS OF ANY LIABILITY FOR LAPSES IN SECURITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that there was evidence building security was lax, but plaintiff’s allowing the attacker, whom plaintiff knew, into to plaintiff’s apartment was an intervening act relieving the building defendants from liability:

Plaintiff, a psychiatrist, was conducting a patient session in his home office when Jacob Nolan, the cousin of his estranged former partner barged unannounced into the office. He was carrying a large black duffel bag and demanded that plaintiff give him certain financial documents required for the child shared by plaintiff and the former partner.… Plaintiff reproached Nolan, successfully expelled him from the apartment and locked the door. After the session, the patient departed but quickly returned to advise the plaintiff that the man who barged in was loitering in a common area of the building. Plaintiff then escorted his patient to the elevator and again engaged Nolan in dialogue. Nolan again communicated that his purported purpose was to retrieve some financial documents for the former partner and asked to use the bathroom in plaintiff’s apartment (which plaintiff made available to patients). Plaintiff then permitted Nolan into his locked apartment to use the bathroom, while plaintiff printed the form Nolan had requested. Nolan then suddenly emerged from the bathroom and attacked plaintiff, hitting him with a sledgehammer and stabbing him multiple times with a knife. Nolan and the former partner were both arrested and convicted for felony assaults upon the plaintiff.

… Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. … [P]laintiff raised legitimate issues regarding lapses in the defendants’ security protocols, such as defendants’ allowing Nolan to enter and wander around the building for over twenty minutes before exiting, only to re-enter the building minutes later without being challenged by the building staff about his continued presence. Plaintiff’s conduct in re-admitting Nolan into the apartment after earlier expelling him, however, constituted an intervening act and a superseding proximate cause … . Weiss v Park Towers S. Co., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02612, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: Here plaintiff knew his attacker and allowed the attacker into his apartment. That was an intervening act and a superseding proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries which insulated the building defendants from liability for lapses in security.

 

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