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HERE DEFENDANT ASHKENAZY’S COUNSEL TOOK POSITIONS WHICH WERE BASED UPON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE; THE FACT THAT THE JUDGE DISAGREED WITH THE INTERPRETATION DID NOT WARRANT A FINDING COUNSEL ENGAGED IN FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT OR ACTED IN BAD FAITH; THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WAS REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the attorney’s (defendant Ashkenazy’s counsel’s) actions did not amount to “frivolous conduct” and did not warrant the imposition of sanctions:

Conduct is frivolous if it is “completely without merit in law,” “undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation,” or “asserts material factual statements that are false” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]). Here, the record does not support an award of sanctions under any of the prongs. The conduct that Supreme Court found sanctionable does not rise to the level of being frivolous. Supreme Court took issue with counsel’s statement that a document squarely addressing the question of timing did not exist. According to Supreme Court, based on its in camera review of documents, there were communications in which the timing of the payment would have been mentioned if it were in fact due on a date other than the five-year paydown date. Supreme Court disagreed with Ashkenazy’s counsel’s interpretation of the documents, and did so by relying on the absence of a statement in the documents rather than an overt statement contained in the documents. Counsel put forth its interpretation of the documents exchanged during discovery — namely, among other things, Ashkenazy’s personal interpretation of the contract, Ashkenazy’s deposition testimony, and the deposition testimony of Ashkenazy’s drafting counsel — and then made arguments based on its interpretation. Those arguments were not completely devoid of merit. Nor is there any indication in the record that counsel’s interpretation and arguments were made in bad faith ,,, , The fact that the court took a different view of the evidence is not grounds for sanctions…. . Talos Capital Designated Activity Co. v 257 Church Holdings LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 01786, First Dept 4-2-24

Practice Point: As long as an attorney’s argument is based upon an interpretation of the evidence which is not meritless, the attorney’s argument is not frivolous or made in bad faith such that sanctions are warranted.

 

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