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CONSULT THIS OPINION FOR IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS OF WHEN POSTREADINESS DELAY SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PEOPLE; THE DISSENT ARGUED THIS RULING UPENDS DECADES OF PRECEDENT BY ATTRIBUTING A DELAY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE COURT TO THE PEOPLE, RESULTING IN A SPEEDY-TRIAL VIOLATION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over an extensive three-judge dissenting opinion, reversed defendant’s misdemeanor (reckless driving) conviction on speedy-trial grounds. The majority and dissenting opinions are comprehensive and cannot be fairly summarized here. The opinions should be consulted for in depth discussions of how postreadiness delays should be calculated. The dissent argued that decades of precedent have been upended by the majority’s ruling because postreadiness delay which was attributable to the court (the People asked for a 12-day adjournment and the court imposed a 43-day adjournment) was attributed to the People:

Here … the People filed an off-calendar statement of readiness, were not ready on three successive trial dates, and failed to provide any explanation despite the court’s invitation to do so, and despite the opportunity to provide an explanation in their opposition to [defendant’s] 30.30 motion. Indeed, even in their papers to this Court, the People offered no explanation for any of the times they were not ready on a previously scheduled trial date to which they had assented. Surely that conduct does not serve the legislature’s intended purpose of “discourag[ing] prosecutorial inaction” … . Instead, the People’s conduct fits squarely within our dissenting colleagues understanding of postreadiness delays—they are “charged to the People only when the delay is attributable to their inaction and directly implicates their ability to proceed to trial” … .

From the dissent:

The majority’s opinion upends [the] common-sense understanding that courts and parties have relied on for decades by attributing the court’s postreadiness delay to the People. Applied here, this new rule means the People are held responsible for 43 days of postreadiness delay when they requested only a 12-day adjournment and the additional 31 days were undisputedly caused by court—all because the prosecutor appearing did not know the underlying reason for the People’s 12-day adjournment request. People v Labate, 2024 NY Slip Op 01582, CtApp 3-21-24

Practice Point: This opinion should be consulted for in-depth discussions of when postreadiness delay is attributed to the People. The dissent argued decades of precedent have been upended by this ruling because postreadiness delay which should have been attributed to the court was attributed to the People, resulting in a speedy-trial violation.

 

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