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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH BURGLARY AS A SEXUALLY MOTIVATED FELONY, WHICH REQUIRES PROOF THE CRIME WAS MOTIVATED BY SEXUAL GRATIFICATION, THE PEOPLE WERE ENTITLED TO A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY SECOND, WHICH NEED NOT BE MOTIVATED BY SEXUAL GRATIFICATION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the People were entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense (burglary second degree) where the indictment charged burglary second degree as a sexually motivated offense. Defense counsel objected arguing defendant was not given notice of the need to defend against a burglary charge which did not include the “sexual gratification” element. The Appellate Division agreed with defense counsel’s argument, but the Court of Appeals rejected it, noting that a burglary could be motivated by “sexual harassment” but not by “sexual gratification:”

Defendant confronted, assaulted, and groped several women outside of a New York University dormitory, including grabbing a student by the throat and sexually assaulting her. The students managed to run from defendant and into their dormitory. Shortly thereafter, defendant entered the dormitory and had an altercation with the building’s security guard who tried to block his way, but defendant pushed through the turnstiles that separated the dormitory’s public lobby from the elevator bank that led to the private residences. The security guard was able to return defendant to the lobby, where defendant continued to harass students until police arrived and arrested him. * * *

… [C]harging burglary as a sexually motivated felony does not … limit the People to proving that a defendant intended to commit what is traditionally considered a “sex crime” when he or she entered the dwelling. … [T]he People must prove that, regardless of the crime the defendant intended to commit inside the dwelling, the burglary was motivated in substantial part by personal sexual gratification. For example, the People may charge a sexually motivated burglary based on a theory that the defendant intended to commit larceny once inside of a dwelling, but still maintain the motivation for the burglary was sexual gratification.

…[T]he inverse is also possible: the People may argue that the intended crime was obviously sexual in nature, but the jury may find that, although the defendant entered or remained in the dwelling intending to commit that crime, the motivation was something other than sexual gratification. In that situation … the proof may be insufficient to convict defendant of the sexually motivated felony but sufficient as to the lesser included offense of burglary in the second degree. People v Seignious, 2024 NY Slip Op 00927, CtApp 2-22-24

Practice Point: Although it may be possible for defense counsel to ask for a more limited jury instruction, here the People, who had charged defendant with burglary second degree as a sexually motivated felony (with a sexual-gratification element), were entitled to a jury instruction on the the lesser included offense of burglary second degree (with no sexual-gratification element).

 

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