You are here: / / THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL DOWN A PERMANENT CONCRETE STAIRWAY...

THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL DOWN A PERMANENT CONCRETE STAIRWAY DID NOT REMOVE THE INCIDENT FROM THE REACH OF LABOR LAW 240(1); PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was ordered to carry a 200 pound mold up a concrete stairway. He slipped on concrete debris and fell down the stairs. The fact that the concrete stairway was a permanent structure (as opposed to a scaffold or ladder, for example) did not remove it from the reach of Labor Law 240(1):

Contrary to defendants’ contention, the fact that the staircase on which plaintiff fell was constructed as a permanent structure does not remove it from the reach of Labor Law § 240(1) .. . Because plaintiff’s foreman instructed him to work on an elevated work platform—namely, the stairway—defendants were required to provide plaintiff with an adequate safety device to carry the staircase mold up the stairs. Defendants failed to do so, and the absence of a safety device was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. At the time of his fall, plaintiff was following his foreman’s instructions to manually carry the mold up the stairs, and thus, he was not the sole proximate cause of the accident … . DaSilva v Toll GC LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 00862, First Dept 2-20-24

Practice Point: Labor Law 240(1) can apply to a fall from a permanent concrete stairway. The statute does not apply exclusively to temporary structures like scaffolds, for example.

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT START DEMONSTRATING NEW YORK HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS TO WARRANT JURISDICTIONAL DISCLOSURE AND A HEARING (FIRST DEPT).
NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO HIS MOTHER’S APARTMENT.
PARTIES HAD CONSENTED TO PROCEDURES WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE CPLR, SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS, ALTHOUGH UNTIMELY UNDER THE CPLR, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY (FIRST DEPT).
Defendant Was Not Plaintiff’s “Special Employer”
PLAINTIFF’S TRANSLATED AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE TRANSLATOR’S AFFIDAVIT AND WAS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE; THE ROADWAY WHERE THE COLLISION OCCURRED WAS NOT DIVIDED INTO TWO OR MORE CLEARLY MARKED LANES; THEREFORE THE “UNSAFE LANE CHANGE” STATUTE (VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1128(A)) DID NOT APPLY (FIRST DEPT).
A THEORY ASSERTED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, AFTER DISCOVERY HAD ENDED, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD WHICH DID NOT HAVE GUARDRAILS AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION DESPITE DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT LOCK THE WHEELS ON THE SCAFFOLD AND PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE FAINTED OR STEPPED BACKWARDS OFF THE SCAFFOLD (FIRST DEPT).
Inability to Remember Fall and Absence of Witnesses Did Not Preclude Summary Judgment on Labor Law 240(1) Cause of Action

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ALTHOUGH THE SPECIFIC CONTRACT WAS NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT, THE NATURE... PLAINTIFF BOOK-PRINTER REPUDIATED ITS BOOK-PRINTING CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT...