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DEFENDANT OPENED THE DRIVER’S-SIDE DOOR OF HIS PARKED CAR WITHOUT MAKING SURE IT WAS SAFE TO DO SO, A VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, AND PLAINTIFF WAS UNABLE TO AVOID STRIKING DEFENDANT’S CAR; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY AND THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPARATIVE-NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. Defendant suddenly opened the driver’s side door of his parked car and plaintiff struck defendant’s car. Opening the door without  making sure it is safe to do so is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability and dismissing defendant’s comparative-negligence affirmative defense:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214, “[n]o person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so, and can be done without interfering with the movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave a door open on the side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.” Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting her affidavit, which demonstrated that [defendant] violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214 by opening the door on the side of his vehicle adjacent to moving traffic when it was not reasonably safe to do so, and was negligent in failing to see what, by the reasonable use of his senses, he should have seen, and that his negligence proximately caused the accident … . Gil v Frisina, 2024 NY Slip Op 00407, Second Dept 1-31-24

Practice Point: Opening the drive’s side door of a parked car without checking to see it is safe to do so is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

 

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