New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Evidence2 / DEFENDANT OPENED THE DRIVER’S-SIDE DOOR OF HIS PARKED CAR WITHOUT...
Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT OPENED THE DRIVER’S-SIDE DOOR OF HIS PARKED CAR WITHOUT MAKING SURE IT WAS SAFE TO DO SO, A VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, AND PLAINTIFF WAS UNABLE TO AVOID STRIKING DEFENDANT’S CAR; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY AND THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPARATIVE-NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. Defendant suddenly opened the driver’s side door of his parked car and plaintiff struck defendant’s car. Opening the door without  making sure it is safe to do so is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability and dismissing defendant’s comparative-negligence affirmative defense:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214, “[n]o person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so, and can be done without interfering with the movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave a door open on the side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.” Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting her affidavit, which demonstrated that [defendant] violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214 by opening the door on the side of his vehicle adjacent to moving traffic when it was not reasonably safe to do so, and was negligent in failing to see what, by the reasonable use of his senses, he should have seen, and that his negligence proximately caused the accident … . Gil v Frisina, 2024 NY Slip Op 00407, Second Dept 1-31-24

Practice Point: Opening the drive’s side door of a parked car without checking to see it is safe to do so is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

 

January 31, 2024
Tags: Second Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-01-31 10:46:062024-02-03 10:48:05DEFENDANT OPENED THE DRIVER’S-SIDE DOOR OF HIS PARKED CAR WITHOUT MAKING SURE IT WAS SAFE TO DO SO, A VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, AND PLAINTIFF WAS UNABLE TO AVOID STRIKING DEFENDANT’S CAR; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY AND THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPARATIVE-NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).
You might also like
RESTAURANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL HAD LAST BEEN CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST STRUCK FROM BEHIND, NO EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER FATHER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, CONSENT ORDER REVIEWABLE IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE.
Criteria for Presentation of Defense Expert Re: the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony Explained (Criteria Not Met Here)
Town Failed to Demonstrate It Did Not Create Dangerous Condition—Summary Judgment in Favor of Town Denied—Exception to Written Notice Requirement​
EVIDENCE OF KNOWING POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED.
ONLY THE COURT CHARGED WITH EMPANELING THE GRAND JURY CAN ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES; IN ORANGE COUNTY THE COURT CHARGED WITH EMPANELING GRAND JURIES IS COUNTY COURT; THEREFORE THE PETITON FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROHIBITING A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE FROM ORDERING THE RELEASE OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WAS GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE TO ENTER AN ‘INFORMAL APPEARANCE’ IN AN ACTION WHICH WILL AVOID A DEFAULT, THE APPEARANCE MUST BE MADE WITHIN THE STATUTORY TIME LIMITS; THE PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT’S INNOCENT TEMPORARY POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS THE RESULT OF... PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A UNIFIED TRIAL (LIABILITY AND DAMAGES) IN THIS...
Scroll to top