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DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED IT WAS AN OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD WHICH HAD RELINQUISHED CONTROL OVER THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON A FLOOR ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SLIPPERY BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN WAXED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant Trinity demonstrated it was an out-of-possession landlord and the area where plaintiff slipped and fell was under the control of the lessee (LSSNY), plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff alleged the floor was slippery because it had been waxed:

Defendant established prima facie that it was an out-of-possession landlord with no contractual obligation to maintain the demised premises. Defendant also established prima facie, that the accident was not caused by a structural or design defect that violated a specific statutory safety provision … . * * *

… [P]laintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant possessed and controlled the leased premises for purposes of liability. Plaintiff’s averment that she saw defendant’s personnel freely using the location during the three years she worked at the premises was insufficient to demonstrate that there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant relinquished complete control over the area before she fell … . Rodriguez v Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 2023 NY Slip Op 05453, First Dept 10-26-23

Practice Point: Here the out-of-possession landlord was not liable for plaintiff’s fall on a slippery floor. The alleged defect was not structural and did not violate a statutory duty.

 

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