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ALTHOUGH THE TEN-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS NOT WRONGFUL, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY THE INTEREST ACCRUED DURING THE DELAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this foreclosure action was not entitled to interest for the ten years between the judgment of foreclosure and the sale of the property:

… [T]he plaintiff explained that his delay in proceeding with the sale of the subject property was based upon his opinion that it was not worthwhile to pursue a foreclosure sale due to market conditions and his belief that there was “no significant equity in the property” beyond the amount of the first mortgage on the property, which had priority over that held by the plaintiff. While the plaintiff’s failure to conduct the sale based on a potential financial benefit to him was not wrongful conduct, per se, his inaction was the sole cause of the accrual of more than 10 years of postjudgment interest, which is roughly equivalent to the principal amount awarded in the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale in the first instance (see CPLR 5004). Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable to charge Romano [defendant] with such accrued interest … . Krupnick v Romano, 2023 NY Slip Op 05398, Second Dept 10-25-23

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff did not sell the property until ten years after the judgment of foreclosure due to market conditions. Although the delay was not wrongful, the defendant should not be required to the pay the interest on the judgment accrued during the ten-year delay.

 

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