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You are here: Home1 / Municipal Law2 / THE DRIVER OF THE FIRE ENGINE RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S...
Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE DRIVER OF THE FIRE ENGINE RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S STOPPED CAR WHILE MAKING A RIGHT TURN FROM A LANE TO THE LEFT OF PLAINTIFF; IT WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE FIRE-ENGINE DRIVER ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the city was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case involving a fire engine responding to an emergency. Plaintiff had stopped in the right lane and was struck by the fire engine as it made a right turn from the lane to the left of plaintiff, or possibly from the oncoming lane. The Second Department determined the city had demonstrated, as a matter of law, the reckless-disregard standard was not triggered:

“The reckless disregard standard requires evidence that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome” … . “The reckless disregard standard, which requires that a plaintiff show more than a momentary judgment lapse on the part of the defendant, allows emergency personnel to act swiftly and resolutely while at the same time protecting the public’s safety” … .

… [T]he defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the applicable standard of care was reckless disregard, as Roberts [the engine driver] was engaging in conduct specified in Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1104(b)(2) and 1104(b)(4) at the time of the collision … . The defendants further demonstrated, prima facie, that Roberts’s conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others … . Moore v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 05128, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: The fact that the fire engine struck plaintiff’s stopped car while making a right turn from a lane to the plaintiff’s left did not raise a question of fact about whether the engine-driver demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

 

October 11, 2023
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-10-11 18:24:312023-10-14 18:59:52THE DRIVER OF THE FIRE ENGINE RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S STOPPED CAR WHILE MAKING A RIGHT TURN FROM A LANE TO THE LEFT OF PLAINTIFF; IT WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE FIRE-ENGINE DRIVER ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS (SECOND DEPT).
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