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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHO HAD THE GREEN LIGHT AND WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER SAW WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact which precluded summary judgment in favor of defendants in this intersection traffic accident case. Although plaintiffs’ car was struck when attempting a left turn across defendant’s oncoming lane, there was conflicting evidence about which party had the green light and whether defendant failed to see what should have been seen:

Susan [plaintiff] testified at her deposition that she entered the subject intersection to turn left when a traffic arrow controlling the left turn was green in her favor. In contrast, Peter [defendant] testified at his deposition that the traffic light was green in his favor as he approached the subject intersection from the opposite direction. In addition, Peter testified that there was nothing obstructing his view of the intersection as he began to drive through it, and it is undisputed that he then struck the plaintiff’s vehicle on the middle portion of the passenger side door. Thus, although the defendants submitted some evidence that Susan failed to yield the right-of-way to the defendants’ vehicle at the intersection in apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141, the evidence submitted by the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Peter entered the intersection against a red traffic light in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d)(1) or, if the traffic light was green in his favor, failed to exercise reasonable care notwithstanding the invitation to proceed by the green light facing him … . Accordingly, the defendants did not establish, prima facie, that Susan’s failure to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the defendants were themselves free from fault … . Schmitz v Pinto, 2023 NY Slip Op 04983, Second Dept 10-4-23

Practice Point: There can be more than one proximate cause of a traffic accident. Although plaintiff was struck making a left turn across defendant’s lane, there were questions of fact about who had the green light, and, if defendant had the green light, whether he should have seen what was there to be seen (plaintiff’s car was struck in the middle of the passenger door).

 

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