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THE LABOR LAW CONSTRUCTION-ACCIDENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN JOINED OR CONSOLIDATED WITH THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE CONSTRUCTION-ACCIDENT INJURIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to join or consolidate the Labor Law construction accident causes of action with the medical malpractice action stemming from the injuries should not have been granted:

Plaintiff commenced suit in Kings County against several construction-related entities alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241, and common-law negligence in connection with a work place accident causing injuries. After the accident plaintiff was taken to a NYCHHC facility for treatment. Plaintiff also commenced this suit in New York County against NYCHHC, alleging medical malpractice in connection with his post-accident treatment. Although the Labor Law action and this medical malpractice action involve common questions of fact, the medical malpractice action involves numerous additional allegations of professional negligence and injuries that are irrelevant to the Labor law action, and there are no common defendants.

The issues and applicable legal principles presented in plaintiff’s Labor Law action and this medical malpractice action arising out of his subsequent treatment, are so dissimilar that joinder or consolidation pursuant to CPLR 602(a) would not be beneficial and would likely result in jury confusion … . Licona-Rubio v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 04722, First Dept 9-26-23

Practice Point: Even though the construction-accident injuries were the basis for the medical malpractice action, the Labor Law and medical malpractice actions (against different defendants) should not have been joined or consolidated.

 

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