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EVIDENCE THAT THE LADDER TILTED CAUSING PLAINTIFF TO JUMP OFF WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this ladder fall case. It was enough that the ladder tilted causing plaintiff to jump off onto a plank below. Plaintiff alleged a nail which would have prevented the ladder from tilting was missing. Plaintiff’s actions were not the sole proximate cause of the injury:

“Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites” … . “‘In order to prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, a plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that the violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries'” … .

Here, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that his injuries were proximately caused by a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) by submitting, inter alia, his deposition testimony that he was working on a ladder which tilted, causing him to lose his balance and jump onto the plank below … .

… The defendants’ contentions that the plaintiff leaned to one side while he was working and that he jumped off the ladder as it began to tilt were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries … . Acevedo v PSM Long Is. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 03322, Second Dept 6-21-23

Practice Point: Evidence that the ladder tilted causing plaintiff to jump off warranted summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. The defendants’ contention that the ladder tilted because plaintiff leaned to the side did not raise a question of fact about whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.

 

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