You are here: / / THE ORDER SUSPENDING THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE DURING COVID APPLIED HERE;...

THE ORDER SUSPENDING THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE DURING COVID APPLIED HERE; DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the Executive Order suspending Criminal Procedure Law 30.30 (speedy trial) during the COVID pandemic was applicable and defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the speedy trial statute should not have been granted:

Executive Order 202.87, while it was in effect, constituted a toll of the time within which the People must be ready for trial for the period from the date a felony complaint was filed through the date of a defendant’s arraignment on the indictment, with no requirement that the People establish necessity in each particular case. We find that the phrase “to the extent necessary” modifies “suspended” and not “toll,” as it “explains how sections 303.30 and 190.80 are suspended—not in their entirety but ‘to the extent necessary'” … . Therefore, “Executive Order 202.87 does not require a showing of necessity to toll time periods because it does not explicitly condition the tolling on necessity” … . Moreover, as the People contend, CPL 30.30(4)(g) permits the exclusion of “periods of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances.” Finding that a showing of necessity is required for the exclusion of time under Executive Order 202.87 would render that Executive Order superfluous and unnecessary. People v Taback, 2023 NY Slip Op 02334, Second Dept 5-3-23

Practice Point: The People do not have to show “necessity” to take advantage of the order suspending the speedy trial statute during COVID.

 

You might also like
NO REASON MOTHER’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE PRESENT, EITHER IN PERSON OR ELECTRONICALLY, DURING A HOME VISIT BY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) (SECOND DEPT).
Ambiguity in Separation Agreement Construed Against Drafter
NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT).
Assault by NYC Firefigthers in a Restaurant Raised Questions of Fact Whether the City Defendants Were Liable for the Injuries to the Plaintiffs Based Upon Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision and/or Retention/Fact that Suit Could Not Be Based Upon Respondeat Superior (Actions Outside the Scope of Employment) Did Not Preclude Suit Based Upon City’s Own Alleged Negligence (!)
A SELLER WHO BREACHES OR SABOTAGES A REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT CANNOT RELY ON REMEDY LIMITATION CLAUSES TO PRECLUDE A BUYER’S ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (SECOND DEPT).
POLICE OFFICERS’ TESTIMONY BASED UPON DEBRIEFING GANG MEMBERS WAS INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY AND THE POLICE OFFICERS, WHO WERE QUALIFIED AS GANG EXPERTS, ACTED AS IMPERMISSIBLE SUMMATION WITNESSES, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS’ ATTENDANCE AT A MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE (CPLR 3408) IN THIS FORECLOSURE CASE DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN “APPEARANCE” IN THE ACTION; THEREFORE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO FIVE DAYS NOTICE (PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (G)) RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
PETITION TO DEEM A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE CITY’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CROSSWALK DEFECT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE COUNTY’S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO PETITIONER’S FOIL REQUEST WITHIN... THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING A CAP ON THE NUMBER OF SERIOUSLY...