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PLAINTIFF’S ACTION RELIED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT AN ACTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT BY SUMMONS IN LIEU OF A COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 (FOURTH DEPT),

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s cause of action was not for the payment of money only (CPLR 3213) for which a summons in lieu of  a complaint was an appropriate vehicle:

As proof of the agreement to reduce defendant’s liability under the guaranty and the amount of that reduction, plaintiff relies on evidence extrinsic to the instrument consisting of representations in the affidavit of its chief operating officer, deposit receipt printouts from the online system of plaintiff’s bank, and a guaranty balance chart apparently generated by plaintiff showing the calculation of defendant’s revised liability.

In our view, “[g]oing that far afield from the [financial] instrument itself does not appear to comport with the simple standards” embodied in the statute and related case law … . Indeed, inasmuch as plaintiff’s moving papers demonstrate that outside evidence beyond “simple proof of nonpayment or a similar de minimis deviation from the face of the document[s]” is needed to determine the amount due, we conclude that “[p]laintiff’s action falls far short of satisfying the [CPLR] 3213 threshold requirement” … . Counsel Fin. II LLC v Bortnick, 2023 NY Slip Op 01441, Fourth Dept 3-17-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff relied on extrinsic evidence. The action was not, therefore, for the “payment of money only” within the meaning of CPLR 3213 and was not properly brought by a summons in lieu of complaint.

 

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