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FAMILY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONDUCT AN IN CAMERA INTERVIEW WITH THE CHILD BEFORE DENYING MOTHER’S PETITION FOR IN-PERSON PARENTAL ACCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the denial of mother’s petition for in-person parental access was not supported by the record, in part because the judge did not conduct an in camera interview with the child:

The Family Court’s determination, in effect, denying that branch of the mother’s petition which was for in-person parental access lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record. “The decision to conduct an in camera interview to determine the best interests of the child is within the discretion of the hearing court” … . Here, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to conduct an in camera interview of the child, particularly given the mother’s testimony that the child’s fear of visiting her in person was due to outside influence … . The child is of such an age and maturity that his preferences are necessary to create a sufficient record to determine his best interests … . Matter of Badal v Wilkinson, 2023 NY Slip Op 00997, Second Dept 2-22-23

Practice Point: Here Family Court should have conducted an in-person interview with the child before denying mother’s petition for in-person parental access. The failure to conduct the interview was deemed an abuse of discretion.

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