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THE ONE-YEAR-AND-NINETY-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR A SUIT AGAINST A SCHOOL DISTRICT IN GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 50-I(1)(C) IS SUBJECT TO THE INFANCY TOLL IN CPLR 208 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the infancy toll (CPLR 208) applies to the one year and 90-day time limit for a suit against a school district (General Municipal Law 50-i(1)(c)). Therefore the application for leave to file a late notice of claim in this action on behalf of an infant student against a school district should have been granted in its entirety:

Supreme Court erred in concluding that any claim by the infant plaintiff based upon incidents that occurred prior to May 31, 2017, would be time-barred. CPLR 208 tolls a statute of limitations for the period of infancy, including the limitation set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-i(1)(c) … . It is undisputed that the infant plaintiff was an infant at the time of the events underlying this action and at the time that the action was commenced. M. S. v Rye Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 00343, Second Dept 1-25-23

Practice Point: The infancy toll of the statute of limitations in CPLR 208 applies to the one-year-ninety-day time limit for a suit against a school district in General Municipal Law 50-i(1)(c).

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