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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT-WIFE’S ATTORNEY IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION MISSED A COUPLE OF THE 60-DAY BILLING PERIODS, THE ATTORNEY WAS IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH 22 NYCRR 1400.3(9) AND THE WIFE’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED; $135,315.90 AWARDED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-wife’s attorney was in substantial compliance with the billing requirements of 22 NYCRR 1400.3(9) and the wife’s request for attorney’s fess in this divorce action should not have been denied:

… [T]he defendant’s attorney was in substantial compliance with 22 NYCRR 1400.3(9) … . Although the attorney for the defendant was dilatory in sending an initial invoice approximately 154 days after he was retained, the billable hours during that interval were itemized and accounted for, and the remainder of the invoices he sent all complied with the 60-day rule. Under the circumstances, the court should not have precluded the defendant from recovering an award of attorneys’ fees for failure to comply with 22 NYCRR 1400.3(9), and we conclude that the plaintiff should be responsible for the balance of the defendant’s attorneys’ fees and expenses, net of his prior payments, less $3,487.50 related to a duplicative motion for expenses, which amounts to $135,315.90. Spataro v Spataro, 2022 NY Slip Op 07470, Second Dept 12-28-22

Practice Point: 22 NYCRR 1400.3(9) requires attorneys in divorce proceeding to bill every 60 days. Here the attorney missed a couple of the 60-day billing periods but the client’s request for attorney’s fees should not have been denied on that ground. The appellate division awarded $135,315.90.

 

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