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THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PRIMA FACIE TORT BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE THE SOLE MOTIVATION OF DEFENDANTS WAS DISINETERESTED MALEVOLENCE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint did not state a cause of action for prima facie tort:

“The requisite elements of a cause of action for prima facie tort are (1) the intentional infliction of harm, (2) which results in special damages, (3) without any excuse or justification, (4) by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful” … .. A plaintiff alleging prima facie tort must therefore allege that the defendant’s “sole motivation was ‘disinterested malevolence’ ” … . … Although the complaint alleges that defendants ” ‘acted maliciously’ and ‘with disinterested malice,’ ” … , it does not allege that defendants’ “sole motivation was ‘disinterested malevolence’ ” … . “There can be no recovery [for prima facie tort] unless a disinterested malevolence to injure [a] plaintiff constitutes the sole motivation for [the] defendant[‘s] otherwise lawful act” … . Spine Surgery of Buffalo Niagara, LLC v Geico Cas. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 07343, Fourth Dept 12-23-22

Practice Point: The criteria for prima facie tort include an allegation that the “sole motivation” for a defendant’s conduct was “disinterested malevolence.”

 

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