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THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS CHAIN-REACTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; THE FACT THAT IT WAS SNOWING AND THERE WERE ICY ROAD CONDITIONS DID NOT SUPPORT THE APPLICABILIITY OF THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE AS A MATTER OF LAW (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court in this chain-reaction traffic accident case, determined there were questions of fact about the weather (snow and ice) and traffic conditions at the time of the accident. Plaintiff was a passenger in the middle car: Supreme Court had dismissed the complaint pursuant to the emergency doctrine:

Striking a vehicle in the rear is negligence as a matter of law absent a sufficient excuse” … . The excuse proffered by defendants here, and accepted by Supreme Court, was that they were confronted with an emergency in the form of sudden snowfall and icy road conditions such that they could not avoid the respective collisions. “[I]n order for a driver to be entitled to summary judgment based upon the emergency doctrine, he or she must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the emergency situation with which he or she was confronted was not of his or her own making and that his or her reaction was reasonable under the circumstances such that he or she could not have done anything to avoid the collision” … . “Whether [a] defendant was presented with an emergency is generally a question of fact” … . In addition, “the emergency doctrine is inapplicable [where a] defendant driver was aware of . . . icy road conditions and should have accounted for them properly” … . “[A] driver is expected to maintain enough distance between himself [or herself] and cars ahead of him [or her] so as to avoid collisions with [slowing or] stopped vehicles, taking into account weather and road conditions” … . Williams v Ithaca Dispatch, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 07278, Third Dept 12-22-22

Practice Point: Although it was snowing and there were icy road-conditions at the time of this chain-reaction traffic accident, the emergency doctrine should not have been applied to dismiss the complaint as a matter of law.

 

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