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THE SO-ORDERED STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES RENDERED THE RELATED CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE COMPLAINT MOOT; THE OTHER CAUSE OF ACTION RELIED ON SPECULATION ABOUT FUTURE EVENTS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT RIPE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined; (1) the stipulation between the two parties rendered the related cause of action in the complaint moot’ and (2) the other cause of action in the complaint was based on speculation about future events and therefore was not ripe for judicial review:

… [P]ursuant to the mootness doctrine, courts are precluded “from considering questions which, although once live, have become moot by passage of time or change in circumstances” … . By contrast, if an “anticipated harm is insignificant, remote or contingent the controversy is not ripe” for judicial review … . “To determine whether a matter is ripe for judicial review, it is necessary first to determine whether the issues tendered are appropriate for judicial resolution, and second to assess the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied” … .

… [T]he first cause of action was resolved by the parties’ so-ordered stipulation. … [T]hat cause of action was rendered academic pursuant to the mootness doctrine … . … [T]he second cause of action relied on speculation about what the County and its various departments might do in response to future audits, and therefore the contemplated harm was both remote and contingent and the controversy was not ripe for judicial review … . Kennedy v Suffolk County, 2022 NY Slip Op 07226, Second Dept 12-21-22

Practice Point: If a cause of action has already been addressed by a so-ordered stipulation, the cause of action is precluded by the mootness doctrine. If a cause of action is based on speculation about future events, it is not ripe for judicial review.

 

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