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ALTHOUGH THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS WERE TIME-BARRED, THE RELATED WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION, BROUGHT WITHIN TWO YEARS OF DEATH, WAS NOT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that, although the medical malpractice actions were time-barred, the related wrongful death action, brought within two years of death, was not:

Although the plaintiff denominated the second cause of action as one for “loss of services,” she alleged all the elements necessary to plead a cause of action for wrongful death, including “(1) the death of a human being, (2) the wrongful act, neglect or default of the defendant by which the decedent’s death was caused, (3) the survival of distributees who suffered pecuniary loss by reason of the death of decedent, and (4) the appointment of a personal representative of the decedent” … . … [T]he wrongful death cause of action was timely. EPTL 5-4.1 provides that an action for wrongful death “must be commenced within two years after the decedent’s death.” Here, the decedent died on November 9, 2013, and this action was commenced on November 9, 2015. Thus, “the cause of action alleging wrongful death was timely commenced within two years of the decedent’s death, since, at the time of [his] death, [the] cause of action sounding in medical malpractice was not time-barred” … .Proano v Gutman, 2022 NY Slip Op 07253, Second Dept 12-21-22

Practice Point: Here the medical malpractice actions were time-barred, but the related wrongful death actions, brought within two years of death, were not.

 

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