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THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST THE DIOCESE; PURSUANT TO THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS SEXUALLY ABUSED BY A PRIEST WHEN HE WAS 15 TO 16 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant Diocese’s motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff, pursuant to the Child Victims Act, alleged he was sexually abused by a priest when he was 15 to 15 years old:

“The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the intent to cause, or the disregard of a substantial likelihood of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress” … . Here, treating as true the plaintiff’s allegations in the second amended complaint, that the defendants had knowledge of the priest’s sexual abuse of the plaintiff and other children, yet concealed the abuse and permitted it to continue, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the alleged conduct was sufficiently outrageous in character and extreme in degree to set forth a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress … . The plaintiff also sufficiently alleged a causal connection between the defendants’ alleged outrageous conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries … . Moreover, this cause of action is not duplicative of the cause of action seeking to recover damages for negligence … . Eskridge v Diocese of Brooklyn, 2022 NY Slip Op 06788, Second Dept 11-30-22

Practice Point: Here the complaint stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Diocese based on the alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff by a priest, criteria explained.

 

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