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THE JUDGE, PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL AGREED DEFENDANT SHOULD STEP OUT OF THE COURTROOM WHEN HIS JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE WAS DISCUSSED IN A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE; DEFENSE COUNSEL’S AGREEMENT TO HAVE DEFENDANT STEP OUT OF THE COURTROOM WAS NOT A WAIVER OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT; CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should have been present for the sidebar conference about the justification defense in this attempted murder by stabbing case. Defendant claimed he had a heart condition triggered by stress which causes his heart to race until he passes out. Defense counsel argued the condition was relevant to the justification defense because defendant felt he had to stab the victim before he passed out to protect himself. Before the issue was discussed the judge, prosecutor and defense counsel agreed the defendant should step out of the courtroom. The judge ruled the evidence of the heart condition could not come in unless the defendant’s testimony established a connection between the condition and the interaction with the victim:

… [T]he subject of the instant sidebar conference clearly implicated defendant’s peculiar factual knowledge such that his participation might have assisted him in advancing his justification defense to the murder and assault counts. The subject of the conference was whether defendant would be permitted to testify as to a medical (heart) condition with regard to his justification defense. During the sidebar conference the court repeatedly implored defense counsel to explain how defendant’s serious medical condition impacted his assessment of his physical safety. Defendant’s presence at the sidebar conference would have afforded him an opportunity to apprise the court, defense counsel and prosecutor of the exact details of his heart condition in order to demonstrate that it affected his assessment of the circumstances he was confronted with prior to the stabbing incident … . * * *

Although the right to be present at a sidebar conference need not be preserved by an objection … , the right may be waived. Such right may be waived either explicitly or implicitly by defendant … . …

… [D]efendant did not waive the right to be present at the sidebar conference. Contrary to the People’s assertion, defendant did not personally waive his right to be present either explicitly or implicitly. At no time did defendant make an affirmative statement on the record that he did not wish to attend the side bar conference. And no one ever asked him directly. … [H]e was commanded to leave the courtroom so that the sidebar conference could take place in his absence. … [A]t no time was defendant made aware that he had the right to be present at the sidebar conference … . …

… [I]n the absence of any record discussion by the court with counsel and the prosecutor regarding defendant’s right to be present at the sidebar conference, defense counsel’s expression of lack of objection to his client absence from the sidebar conference is not an affirmative statement by counsel confirming that defendant himself was waiving his right to be present at the sidebar conference … . People v Girard, 2022 NY Slip Op 06645, First Dept 11-22-22

Practice Point: Defense counsel agreed to have the defendant step out of the courtroom when the justification defense was discussed in a sidebar conference. Defense counsel’s agreement did not constitute a waiver of defendant’s right to be present. The conviction was reversed.

 

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