THE APPELLATE DIVISION AFFIRMED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA AFTER A FLAWED SPEEDY-TRIAL ANALYSIS OF THE EIGHT-YEAR PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY; THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED, EXPLAINED THE FLAWS AND REMITTED THE MATTER FOR A NEW ANALYSIS (CT APP).
The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division’s affirmance of defendant’s (Johnson’s) conviction by guilty plea and remitting the matter for another analysis, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the appellate division did not properly apply the “Taranovich” criteria to the eight-year pre-indictment delay in this rape/sexual abuse case.
In People v Taranovich, we established the following five factors for assessing speedy trial claims: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay … . Although this case concerns pre-indictment delay and is analyzed as a due process claim, we nevertheless apply the test established in Taranovich … . …
The Appellate Division “assume[d], arguendo, that the People failed to establish ‘good cause’ for the ‘protracted’ preindictment delay” … . However, some examination of the reason for the delay is required. Instead of attempting to evaluate the good faith reasons for the various periods of delay, the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the second factor favored Mr. Johnson is based upon an assumption for the sake of argument. …
Turning to the third factor, the “nature” of the underlying crime can refer to both its severity and, relatedly, the complexity and challenges of investigating the crime and gathering evidence to support a prosecution … . … Here, the Appellate Division held that its assumption that the People lacked good cause compelled the result that the “third factor[ ] favors[s] the defendant.” The crime here—the sexual assault of a minor found unresponsive on a city street—is quite serious. The nature of the crime here is directly related to the issues of complexity and may, therefore, account for some of the delay: the victim’s severe intoxication and lack of memory of the assault rendered her unable to identify her attacker. It is not clear on what basis the court concluded that its assumption of lack of good faith led to the conclusion that the third factor favored Mr. Johnson, but that conclusion, apparently based solely on that assumption with no analysis of the relevant concerns, is not supportable. …
In analyzing factor five, the Appellate Division held that because Mr. Johnson pled guilty only to rape in the second degree … , which depends solely on the age difference between the defendant and the victim, “the preindictment delay could not have ‘impaired’ defendant’s ability to defend himself on the charge of which he was convicted” … . This was error. When an indictment contains multiple counts, if delay impacts the defendant’s ability to defend one count, it may weaken that defendant’s position in plea bargaining, potentially adversely impacting the resulting plea … . Thus, the appellate court must consider prejudice measured against all counts pending when the dismissal motion is made, not merely against the crime of conviction. People v Johnson, 2022 NY Slip Op 06537, CtApp 11-17-22
Practice Point: Here the defendant pled guilty after an eight-year pre-indictment delay and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the appellate division’s application of the “Taranovich” framework for determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated seriously flawed. The Court of Appeals explained the flaws and remitted the matter to the appellate division for another speedy-trial analysis. The Court of Appeals noted that, where a defendant is charged with multiple counts, whether the delay impaired the defense must take into account all the charged counts, not just the count to which defendant pled guilty.