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A FINE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PLEA AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating the fine imposed at sentencing, determined the sentencing judge should not have imposed a fine that was not part of the plea agreement:

County Court improperly enhanced the defendant’s sentence by imposing a fine that was not part of the negotiated plea agreement … . Under the circumstances of this case, we find it appropriate to vacate so much of his sentence as imposed a fine, so as to conform the sentence imposed to the promise made to the defendant in exchange for his plea of guilty … . People v Ruiz, 2022 NY Slip Op 06016, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here the imposition of a fine at sentencing which was not contemplated by the plea agreement was deemed an improper enhancement of the sentence.

 

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