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THE PEOPLE WERE CHARGED WITH THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS MOTION ENTITLING DEFENDANT TO RELEASE ON BAIL PURSUANT TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s habeas corpus petition seeking release on bail based upon the speedy-trial statute should have been sustained:

When making a motion pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) to be released on bail or his or her own recognizance, a defendant who has been committed to the custody of the sheriff has the initial burden of demonstrating, by sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time set forth in the statute … . Once a defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time has elapsed without a declaration of readiness by the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay … . The burden is on the People “to ensure, in the first instance, that the record of the proceedings . . . is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering the . . . CPL 30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should be charged” with any delay … .

… [T]he petitioner adequately raised before the Supreme Court the issue of whether the People should be charged with their delay in responding to the defendant’s omnibus motion. … [B]ecause the People did not seek and receive an extension of time to respond to the omnibus motion, or provide any explanation for the delayed response, they are “chargeable with the time between the court-imposed deadline to respond to the omnibus motion and the date on which the People actually filed a response” … . Here, the 13 days chargeable to the People due to their unexplained delay in responding to the omnibus motion, when coupled with the 86 days between the date of arraignment and the date upon which the People filed their certificate of compliance pursuant to CPL 245.50, totals more than 90 days … . People v Molina, 2022 NY Slip Op 04778, Second Dept 7-29-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff had been incarcerated for more than the 90 days allowed by CPL 30.30 and the 13-day delay occasioned by the People’s failure to timely respond to defendant’s omnibus motion was not adequately explained. Therefore defendant’s habeas corpus petition was sustained and he was entitled to release on bail which he is capable of meeting or on his own recognizance.

 

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