THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S MOTORCYCLE WAS SO CLOSE AS TO CONSTITUTE AN IMMEDIATE HAZARD WHEN DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A LEFT TURN ACROSS PLAINTIFF’S LANE OF TRAFFIC; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this intersection traffic accident case should not have been granted summary judgment. Plaintiff motorcyclist collided with defendants’ vehicle as defendant driver was attempting to make a left turn crossing plaintiff’s lane of traffic. The Second Department determined there was a question of fact about whether plaintiff’s motorcycle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard at the time defendant initiated the turn:
Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141, “[t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection . . . shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” … . A violation of this statute constitutes negligence per se … .
The plaintiff failed to meet his prima facie burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the transcripts of his deposition testimony and that of the defendants. This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, as the nonmoving parties, raised triable issues of fact as to whether, at the time the defendant driver initiated her turn, the plaintiff’s motorcycle was “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” … . DePass v Beneduci, 2022 NY Slip Op 04622, Second Dept 7-20-22
Practice Point: Vehicle and Traffic Law 1141 prohibits making a left turn when oncoming traffic is “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” Plaintiff motorcyclist collided with defendant’s car as defendant attempted a left turn across plaintiff’s lane of traffic. Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment but the Second Department held there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was ‘”so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” when defendant initiated her turn.