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THE POLICE WERE “ACTING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE FUNCTION” WHEN THEY SEARCHED THE INJURED DEFENDANT AND FOUND A CARTRIDGE; DEFENDANT WAS DRIFTING IN AND OUT OF CONSCIOUSNESS; THE POLICE PROPERLY SEARCHED HIS POCKETS FOR IDENTIFICATION; SUPPRESSION DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the search of plaintiff’s clothing by the police did not require suppression of the cartridge found in defendant’s pocket because the police were “acting in the public service function” in aiding the injured defendant:

… [T]he hearing court … denied suppression of a cartridge recovered from defendant’s pants pocket, correctly finding that “the police were acting in their public service function in rendering aid when searching the defendant’s clothing for identification.” When police arrived, defendant was lying on the ground and screaming that he had been shot. He appeared to have been shot in the leg, he was drifting in and out of consciousness, and he could not state his name. At that point, the officers were treating defendant as an injured victim rather than a suspect, and were not performing a law enforcement function … . Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to believe defendant needed immediate assistance and to search his pants for identification as they waited for him to be transported to the hospital …  In performing this public service function, it was reasonable for the police to ascertain the identity of the person they were aiding and to supply that information to medical personnel, and defendant did not appear capable of communicating his identity. People v Hatchett, 2022 NY Slip Op 04282, First Dept 7-5-22

Practice Point: When the police aid an injured person and search the person’s pockets for identification, they are “acting in the public service function.” Suppression of any contraband found in the search will be denied.

 

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