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PLAINTIFFS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT (1) WHETHER THE POLICE ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS DURING A HIGH-SPEED CHASE AND IN FAILING TO NOTIFY THE DISPATCHER OF THE CHASE, AND (2) WHETHER THE CHASE WAS A PROXIMATE OR CONCURRENT CAUSE OF PLAINTFFS’ ACCIDENT (THERE WAS NO CONTACT WITH EITHER VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE CHASE) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined plaintiffs raised questions of fact about whether the police acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others during a high-speed chase, and whether the chase of the BMW driven by Llewellyn was a proximate or concurrent cause of the accident (neither vehicle involved in the chase struck plaintiffs’ vehicle):

… [T]he motion court properly held that the reckless disregard standard applied in evaluating the City defendants’ conduct in pursuing Llewellyn (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1104[b], 1104[e]). However, the motion court erred in determining that “there is no evidence that the NYPD officers acted recklessly as a matter of law, and that the pursuit was not the proximate cause or a concurrent cause of this incident” … . …

Plaintiffs … submitted evidence that the City defendants initiated a high-speed chase of Llewellyn’s BMW at close proximity after observing it run a single red light, and continued the high-speed chase, which included crossing over a double yellow line and running two red lights, in a known congested and heavily populated residential area which at the time of the pursuit had moderate to heavy traffic and numerous pedestrians…. . …

Plaintiffs also raised an issue of fact concerning whether the NYPD officers acted recklessly in failing to notify the radio dispatcher at the start of the pursuit and inform headquarters with relevant information, including the nature of the offense. Handelsman v Llewellyn, 2022 NY Slip Op 04093, First Dept 6-23-22

Practice Point: Here there were questions of fact whether the police acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others during a high-speed chase such that the city would be liable for plaintiffs’ accident, and whether the high-speed chase was a proximate or concurrent cause of plaintiffs’ accident (there was no contact with either vehicle involved in the chase). There were questions of fact whether the police drove “in reckless disregard of the safety of others” and whether their failure to notify the dispatcher of the chase was also reckless.

 

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