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You are here: Home1 / Negligence2 / DESPITE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SAY WHICH OF TWO CRACKS IN THE...
Negligence

DESPITE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SAY WHICH OF TWO CRACKS IN THE PAVEMENT CAUSED HIS FALL, THE CAUSE OF THE FALL WAS SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED TO WITHSTAND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted on the ground plaintiff could not identify the cause of his fall. Plaintiff alleged that one of two cracks in the pavement caused the fall:

Plaintiff testified that, on the day of the incident, the weather was clear and there was no snow or debris on the surface of the parking lot. He had parked his car in the parking lot and was approaching the front door of the store when his foot suddenly “hit something along the pavement and . . . stopped,” causing him to fall to the ground. An individual who was walking behind plaintiff came to his aid, helping plaintiff up off the ground and assisting him back to his vehicle. At the time of his fall, plaintiff did not look at the ground to determine the cause. However, he recalled that, after being helped back to his vehicle, he looked back and noticed a cracked area of the pavement where he had fallen. Plaintiff was shown photographs of the parking lot and identified the location of his fall by circling in one of the photographs an uneven area of the pavement with two cracks in close proximity to one another. Upon further questioning, plaintiff was unable to identify which of the two cracks caused the fall, but repeatedly testified that he knew it was one of those two cracks based upon where he landed when he fell.

… Although plaintiff’s statements were not without some inconsistencies, he was steadfast in his testimony that he tripped on one of the two identified cracks in the pavement of the parking lot. Despite Supreme Court’s suggestion to the contrary, plaintiff was not required to state for certain which particular crack caused him to fall in order to withstand summary judgment … . Bovee v Posniewski Enters., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03561, Third Dept 6-2-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff was able to testify that one of two cracks in the pavement was the cause of his fall. The cause was sufficiently identified to withstand summary judgment.​

 

June 2, 2022
Tags: Third Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-02 15:45:402022-06-03 15:58:58DESPITE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT SAY WHICH OF TWO CRACKS IN THE PAVEMENT CAUSED HIS FALL, THE CAUSE OF THE FALL WAS SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED TO WITHSTAND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT).
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