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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE “SEPARATE ENVELOPE” RULE AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action failed to demonstrate the 90-day notice required by RPAPL 1304 was sent to the defendant in a separate envelope:

RPAPL 1304(2) also provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he notices required by this section shall be sent by the lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice.”

The plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it sent 90-day notices to the defendant “in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice” … . Since the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and dismissing his answer with affirmative defenses and for an order of reference, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Bonal, 2022 NY Slip Op 03230, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: To warrant summary judgment in a foreclosure action, the bank must demonstrate that the RPAPL 1304 notice was sent to each borrower in a separate envelope which includes no other materials.

 

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