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PLAINTIFF, A FLORIDA RESIDENT, ALLEGEDLY WAS ABUSED BY A PRIEST IN FLORIDA IN 1983 AND 1984; PLAINTIFF SUED THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN BECAUSE THE PRIEST WHO ALLEGEDLY ABUSED HIM WAS TRANSFERRED FROM BROOKLYN TO FLORIDA, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT WITH CHILDREN; THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE NONRESIDENT PLAINTIFF AND THE BORROWING STATUTE DOES APPLY; THEREFORE FLORIDA’S FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RENDERED PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion, in a matter of first impression, by Justice Christopher, determined the New York Child Victims Act, CPLR 214-g, is not available to nonresident plaintiffs where the alleged acts of abuse occurred outside New York. CPLR 214-g extends the statute of limitations to allow lawsuits by plaintiffs who were children at the time of the abuse. The Second Department further determined CPLR 214-g does not preclude the application of the borrowing statute, CPLR 202. Here the plaintiff, a Florida resident, alleged the acts of abuse were committed in Florida in 1983 and 1984 by Father William Authenrieth. Plaintiff alleged Father Authenrieth was transferred from the Diocese of Brooklyn to the Florida Diocese of Orlando (Florida) in 1973 because of his sexual misconduct with children. Hence the suit by the Florida plaintiff against the Diocese of Brooklyn. Because CPLR 214-g does not apply and CPLR 202, the borrowing statute, requires the application of Florida’s four-year statute of limitations, plaintiff’s suit is time-barred:

… [U]nder the circumstances of this case, CPLR 214-g does not apply extraterritorially, where the plaintiff is a nonresident, and the alleged acts of sexual abuse were perpetrated by a nonresident outside of New York … . * * *

… [U]nder these circumstances the borrowing statute would apply, and since the plaintiff’s action is time-barred in Florida, it would also be time-barred in New York, unless, as argued by the plaintiff, CPLR 214-g precludes the application of CPLR 202. … We answer that question in the negative. Therefore, even if CPLR 214-g applied extraterritorially, the plaintiff’s action would be dismissed as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 202. S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn, 2022 NY Slip Op 02982, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: The Child Victims Act, which extends the statute of limitations for plaintiffs who were abused as children, does not apply to this Florida plaintiff who was allegedly abused in Florida. Plaintiff sued the Diocese of Brooklyn under the theory that the priest who abused him in Florida in 1983 and 1984 was transferred to Florida from Brooklyn, allegedly because of sexual misconduct with children. New York’s borrowing statute applied rendering the action time-barred under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations.

 

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