You are here: / / A CORPORATE OFFICER OR SHAREHOLDER CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR NONFEASANCE...
, ,

A CORPORATE OFFICER OR SHAREHOLDER CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR NONFEASANCE (DOING NOTHING), AS OPPOSED MISFEASANCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint against the individual defendant, John Milevoi, an officer or shareholder of the  property management company, defendant M&L Milevoi Management, must be dismissed. Plaintiff alleged a leak in the ceiling of her apartment caused her slip and fall:

The complaint should be dismissed against the individual defendant John Milevoi, because there is no allegation that his liability stems from an act of misfeasance or malfeasance, as opposed to nonfeasance. A corporate officer or shareholder may not be held personally liable for a failure to act … . Defendant owner and defendant management company, on the other hand, have not established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. De Barcacel v 1015 Concourse Owners Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 02869, First Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: A corporate officer or shareholder cannot be personally liable for nonfeasance (doing nothing), as opposed to misfeasance. The complaint against the corporate officer or shareholder here was dismissed. But the complaint against the corporation was not. The corporation is a property management company and plaintiff’s slip and fall complaint alleged there was a water leak in her apartment.

 

You might also like
NYPD PROPERLY REQUIRED TO RELEASE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ITS USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES INCLUDING FACIAL RECOGNITION, IRIS RECOGNITION AND MOBILE X-RAY TECHNOLOGIES (FIRST DEPT).
HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION SECURITY DEPOSIT VOUCHERS MUST BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF CASH DEPOSITS; TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE VOUCHERS VIOLATES THE NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; THE VOUCHER PROGRAM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW OR THE URSTADT LAW (FIRST DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether ​”Intervening Criminal Act” at Homeless Facility Was Foreseeable
IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE CONTRACT WHETHER DEFENDANT TRUSTEE WAS TO PERFORM A MERELY MINISTERIAL FUNCTION OR A GATEWAY FUNCTION IN ACCEPTING ASSETS FOR THE TRUST FROM A NONPARTY WHICH WAS ACTING FRAUDULENTLY; THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DAMAGES ASSOCIATED WITH ACCEPTING NON-NEGOTIABLE ASSETS WERE DIRECT OR INDIRECT AND WHETHER A FIDUCIARY DUTY WAS BREACHED (FIRST DEPT).
Including “Statute of Limitations” in a Catch-All Paragraph Listing Many Affirmative Defenses Did Not Provide Plaintiff with Sufficient Notice—At a Bare Minimum, the Duration of the Relevant Statute of Limitations, Six Years Here, Should Be Pled
THE ORDER WAS NOT ENTERED ON CONSENT AND THEREFORE WAS APPEALABLE; GRANDPARENTS’ PETITIONS FOR VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ABSENT A FULL TRIAL (FIRST DEPT).
HERE THE DEFENDANTS RAISED PLAINTIFF’S SIGNING A RELEASE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE; THE COMPLAINT ALONG WITH PLAINTIFF’S AFFIRMATION ADEQUATELY ALLLEGED THE RELEASE WAS THE PRODUCT OF OVERREACHING OR UNFAIR CIRCUMSTANCES AND THEREFORE WAS NOT A BAR TO CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT WHICH ECUADORIAN STATUTE IS MOST CLOSELY ANALOGOUS TO NEW YORK’S FRAUDULENT-CONVEYANCE CRITERIA FOR PURPOSES OF NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE; HERE THE ACTION ACCRUED IN ECUADOR; THE SHORTER OF THE APPLICABLE ECUADORIAN AND NEW YORK STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WILL APPLY (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS IN THE ELEVATOR SHAFT WHEN THE ELEVATOR, OPERATING... THE CITY COMMISSIONER ORDERED THE DEMOLITION OF A GRAIN ELEVATOR, A CITY LANDMARK,...