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THE BIOLOGICAL MOTHER AND THE ADOPTIVE MOTHER ENTERED A POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENT WHICH ALLOWED TWO SUPERVISED VISITS WITH THE BIOLOGICAL MOTHER PER YEAR; THE EVIDENCE OF THE CHILDREN’S BEHAVIOR AFTER VISITING WITH THE BIOLOGICAL MOTHER SUPPORTED FAMILY COURT’S CONCLUSION IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN TO TERMINATE VISITATION WITH THE BIOLOGICAL MOTHER; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE EVIDENCE OF THE DAUGHTER’S, IN CONTRAST TO THE SON’S, POST-VISIT BEHAVIOR DID NOT SUPPORT TERMINATION OF VISITATION WITH THE DAUGHTER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice partial dissent, determined Family Court properly terminated the biological mother’s visitation with her children who had been adopted. The biological mother and the adoptive mother had entered a postadoption contact agreement which allowed the biological mother two supervised visits per year with her son and daughter. The evidence at the fact-finding hearing demonstrated that the son’s behavior changed drastically after visits. His behavior was characterized as “out of control.” There was evidence the daughter began banging her head and had nightmares after a visit. The dissent argued the evidence supported termination of visits with the son, but did not support the termination of visits with the daughter:

The adoptive mother testified that after visiting the biological mother in December 2017, the son destroyed rooms in the house and was completely out of control for close to a month. After the July 2018 visit with the biological mother, the son “climb[ed] the walls in [his] classroom,” hit his friend, hurt his sister and had difficulties regulating his behavior for several months. * * *

With respect to the dissent’s reference to the policy concerns underlying postadoption contact agreements, we note that we wholeheartedly embrace and promote the policies and goals of these types of agreements and encourage open adoptions. However, it is not our intention to address the underlying policies of postadoption contact agreements, but, instead, to focus solely upon the principle governing and guiding the initiation and continuation of open contact between the children and the biological parent — the best interests of the children. Here, it is uncontroverted that the daughter displayed a persistent pattern of bizarre and harmful behavior — head banging and disrupted sleep due to nightmares — commensurate with visits with her biological mother. These behaviors continued for 1½ years. Although the daughter did not display the behaviors at the time of the visits, a time when the adoptive parents were present and the daughter’s attention was directed toward other activities, the behaviors were manifested subsequent to each visit. … [W]e cannot agree that enforcing visitation with respect to one sibling but not the other serves the best interests of either. Matter of Jennifer JJ. v Jessica JJ., 2022 NY Slip Op 02043, Third Dept 3-24-22

Practice Point: The postadoption contact agreement allowing the biological mother to visit her children after adoption was properly terminated by the court because the evidence of the children’s post-visit behavior supported the conclusion continued visitation was not in the best interests of the children.

 

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