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THE MAJORITY HELD THE APPELLATE DIVISION PROPERLY REFUSED TO HEAR APPELLANT FATHER’S APPEAL IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING BECAUSE FATHER WAS IN DEFAULT (NO APPEAL LIES FROM A DEFAULT); THE DISSENT ARGUED FATHER WAS NOT IN DEFAULT BECAUSE HE APPEARED BY COUNSEL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, over a strong dissent, determined the Appellate Division properly concluded it could not hear the appellant father’s appeal in this termination-of-parental-rights proceeding because he was in default (no appeal lies from a default judgment). The dissent argued father appeared by counsel and therefore was not in default:

Before this Court, appellant does not dispute the Appellate Division’s determination that his failure to appear constituted a default.

From the dissent:

The only reviewable issue before us is whether the Appellate Division properly dismissed appellant father’s appeal from a Family Court order terminating his parental rights on the ground that appellant defaulted. That decision was in error because appellant appeared through counsel during the fact-finding and dispositional hearings, as acknowledged by Family Court, and in accordance with the Family Court Act and the CPLR (see Family Ct Act § 165; CPLR 3215 [a]). Matter of Irelynn S., 2022 NY Slip Op 01869, Ct App 3-17-22

Practice Point: No appeal lies from a default judgment. The dissent argued: A party who appears by counsel, as appellant father did in these termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, is not in default.

 

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