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THE FLORIDA DEFENDANTS ADVERTISED THROUGH A NATIONWIDE WEBSITE; THE NEW YORK PLAINTIFFS SOLICITED THE CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANTS; PLAINTIFFS DID NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF EITHER GENERAL OR SPECIFIC (LONG-ARM) JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case of general or specific (long-arm) jurisdiction over the Florida defendants in this breach of contract and fraud action. Through email correspondence the New York plaintiffs entered a contract for the creation of a “Dating App” for which plaintiffs allegedly paid $100,000. Plaintiff alleged defendants never provided the Dating App and sued in New York. The jurisdiction over the breach of contract action was analyzed under the general jurisdiction criteria, and jurisdiction over the fraud (tort) action was analyzed under the specific jurisdiction (long-arm) criteria:

In opposing the separate motions of [defendants], the plaintiffs asserted that jurisdiction over both defendants was proper pursuant to CPLR 301 and 302(a)(1) and (3). “Under modern jurisprudence, a court may assert general all-purpose jurisdiction or specific conduct-linked jurisdiction over a particular defendant”… . Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, they did not make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction … . The complaint itself establishes that [the individual defendant] is domiciled in Florida and that [the corporate defendant] was incorporated in and has its principal place of business in Florida … . Further, the facts alleged, even if established, do not support a conclusion that [defendant corporation’s] contacts with New York were so “continuous and systematic” …  as to render it “essentially at home” in New York … .

Specific jurisdiction over a defendant is obtained through New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302. * * *

“The CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdictional inquiry is twofold: under the first prong the defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in the state, and under the second prong, the claims must arise from the transactions” … . …

The affidavits … establish that [the corporate defendant] advertises its services nationwide through a website that is not specifically directed toward New York residents or businesses. It is undisputed that the plaintiff … initiated the contact between the parties and solicited the defendants’ services in designing the Dating App. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, [the corporate defendant’s] website does not constitute transacting business within the State. Fanelli v Latman, 2022 NY Slip Op 00849, Second Dept 2-9-22

 

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