You are here: / / THE FACT THAT THE CITY BUILDING CODE DID NOT REQUIRE DISABLED-ACCESS TO...
,

THE FACT THAT THE CITY BUILDING CODE DID NOT REQUIRE DISABLED-ACCESS TO THE THIRD FLOOR OF DEFENDANT RESTAURANT DID NOT CONFLICT WITH THE FACT THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAY REQUIRE SUCH ACCESS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, a disabled wheelchair user, had standing to bring a discrimination action against defendant restaurant alleging the third floor of the restaurant was not accessible. The fact that the NYC Building Code did not require disabled-access to the third floor based on the square-footage did not conflict with the Human Rights Law which may require access:

The Building Code and disability discrimination laws serve different purposes and can easily be enforced and harmonized. The Building Code serves foremost to ensure safety in construction and maintenance of structures. The accessibility provision at issue simply states that no disabled access is required for building areas which measure less than 2,500 square feet. The provision does not prohibit building owners from providing such access — it simply provides that, for purposes of the Building Code, no such access is required.

The disability discrimination laws are designed, as pertinent here, to ensure that disabled persons have reasonable access to public accommodations. While the Building Code might not require disabled access under the circumstances present here, this does not mean that more may not be required under the State and City Human Rights Laws’ (HRLs) disability discrimination provisions. In this, there is no conflict. To the extent there is any tension between the Building Code’s provisions and the HRLs, such tension may be remedied by the rule of reasonableness which is an integral component of the HRLs’ requirement that disabled persons be reasonably accommodated (see Executive Law § 296[c][i]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[15][b]). Jones v McDonald’s Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 00814, First Dept 2-8-22

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT HEARSAY EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING ONE OF THE ROBBERY VICTIMS, WHO DID NOT TESTIFY, FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT IN A LINEUP, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANT CORPORATION’S REGISTRATION STATEMENT CONTAINED FALSE AND MISLEADING CLAIMS WHICH INDUCED PLAINTIFF TO BUY STOCK IN DEFENDANT’S CORPORATION; THE CLAIMS IN DEFENDANT’S REGISTRATION STATEMENT WERE MERE PUFFERY AND WERE NOT ACTIONABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE SECURITES ACT OF 1933 (FIRST DEPT).
Criteria for Domicile Explained
FACTS WHICH LED TO A PROCEEDING THAT WAS ULTIMATELY SEALED AND HEARSAY ARE ADMISSIBLE AT ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN THIS DRUG ACTIVITY-DELINQUENT RENT ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON UNSIGNED COPIES OF A DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RETURN SIGNED COPIES WITHIN 60 DAYS AND DID NOT CHALLENGE THE ACCURACY OF THE TRANSCRIPT (FIRST DEPT).
CHILD’S INCOMPLETE TESTIMONY STRICKEN IN A FAMILY COURT ACT 1028 PROCEEDING MAY BE ADMITTED IN A FAMILY COURT ACT 1046 CHILD ABUSE PROCEEDING (FIRST DEPT).
NEW YORK’S TAX SCHEME DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE BY DOUBLE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLE INCOME RE PLAINTIFFS WHO ARE STATUTORY RESIDENTS OF NEW YORK AND DOMICILED IN CONNECTICUT (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE AND SNOW... PLAINTIFF STARTED AN ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT IN NEW YORK; THEN DEFENDANT STARTED...