You are here: / / CLASS CERTIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED THE TENANTS IN THIS RENT-OVERCHARGE...
, ,

CLASS CERTIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED THE TENANTS IN THIS RENT-OVERCHARGE ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined class certification in this rent overcharge action should not have been denied. The tenants alleged the landlord unlawfully deregulated apartments while receiving J-51 tax benefits:

Class certification was improperly denied. The determination of whether plaintiffs have a cause that may be asserted as a class action turns on the application of CPLR 901. That section provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all” where five factors — sometimes characterized “as numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation and superiority” … . The party seeking class certification has the burden of establishing the prerequisites of CPLR 901(a) and thus establishing entitlement to certification … .

Here, plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating the prerequisites for class action certification under CPLR 901 and 902. Contrary to the motion court’s determination, plaintiffs established numerosity and typicality in their initial motion for class certification. The allegations in the amended complaint taken with the DOF tax bills showed that by June 2017, only 8 of 100 apartments were registered as rent-stabilized. … [T]his Court [has] held that similar bills were sufficient to establish numerosity, i.e., the number of deregulated units. As to typicality, the predominant legal question involves one that applies to the entire class—whether defendant unlawfully deregulated rent-stabilized apartments while receiving J-51 real estate tax abatement benefits. Cupka v Remik Holdings LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 00812, First Dept 2-8-22

 

You might also like
RENOVATION WORK ON DEFENDANTS’ TOWNHOUSE RENDERED PLAINTIFFS’ TOWNHOUSE, WHICH WAS NEXT DOOR, UNINHABITABLE; A LICENSE AGREEMENT WHICH GRANTED DEFENDANTS ACCESS TO PLAINTIFFS’ TOWNHOUSE INCLUDED A LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION WHICH WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE; PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION SOUGHT SOME EQUITABLE RELIEF BUT PRIMARILY SOUGHT MONEY DAMAGES; THEREFORE PLANTIFFS’ DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS CRANE-ACCIDENT CASE; THE ESPINAL ‘LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM’ CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY WHICH REFURBISHED AND MAINTAINED THE CRANE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
MOTION TO VACATE DEFENDANT’S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE IMPROPERLY RELIED ON CPL 440.30 (d) WHICH ONLY APPLIES IF THE MOTION IS BASED SOLELY ON AN ALLEGATION BY THE DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT).
THE CONTRACTOR COULD NOT ESCAPE LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR; THE PAY-WHEN-PAID CLAUSE IN THE CONTRACT IS INVALID; NOTHING IN THE CONTRACT INDICATED THE CONTRACTOR WAS ACTING SOLELY AS AN AGENT FOR THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT).
NO APPEAL LIES FROM AN ORDER ISSUED ON DEFAULT, A MOTION TO VACATE IS THE ONLY REMEDY; NO APPEAL LIES FROM AN ORDER ISSUED ON CONSENT (FIRST DEPT).
IN A FORECLOSURE CONTEXT, THE BANK, WHEN MOVING FOR A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT, GETS TWO CHANCES TO DEMONSTRATE THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY; IF THE FIRST SUBMISSION IS DEEMED INADEQUATE, THE BANK MUST BE ALLOWED TO TRY AGAIN (FIRST DEPT).
ALLEGED TORTIOUS ACTS DID NOT OCCUR IN NEW YORK, OUT OF STATE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CONTACT WITH NEW YORK TO MEET DUE PROCESS STANDARDS, NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION (FIRST DEPT).
Whether the “Assault and Battery” Exclusion from Coverage Pertained to an Arson Is a Question of Fact Which Depends Upon the Motives of the Arsonist

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF STARTED AN ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT IN NEW YORK; THEN DEFENDANT STARTED... PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED...