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DEFENDANT WAS A PRIME, NOT A GENERAL, CONTRACTOR AND DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISION OR CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6); HOWEVER, DEFENDANT DID EXERCISE SOME CONTROL OVER WORK-SITE SAFETY AND THEREFORE MAY BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant prime contractor, Kilian, did not supervise or control plaintiff’s work and therefore was not liable on the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action stemming from plaintiff’s fall down an open stairway at a house under construction. The Fourth Department noted the difference between a general contractor and a prime contractor. Here, Kilian (the prime contractor) demonstrated he did not exercise supervision or control over plaintiff’s work. However, Kilian did exercise some control over work-site safety and therefore may be liable under Labor Law 200 for the dangerous condition (open stairwell):

“A general contractor will be held liable under [Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6)] if it was responsible for coordinating and supervising the entire construction project and was invested with a concomitant power to enforce safety standards and to hire responsible contractors” … . Here, Collins, not Kilian, hired plaintiff’s employer to perform work on the project, and Kilian established through the documentary evidence and deposition testimony that he exercised no control or supervision over plaintiff’s work and had no authority to enforce safety standards against plaintiff … . Thus, Kilian established as a matter of law that he was not a general contractor subject to liability pursuant to Labor Law §§ 240 (1) or 241 (6), and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . …

… [T]o the extent that the section 200 claim against Kilian is based on the theory that he was negligent with respect to the dangerous condition of the stairwell, we conclude that Kilian failed to establish as a matter of law that he did not have control over the work site or that he lacked actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, i.e., the unguarded, open stairwell … . Clifton v Collins, 2022 NY Slip Op 00780, Fourth Dept 2-4-22

 

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