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PLAINTIFF WAS IN A TRENCH WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY THE BUCKET OF AN EXCAVATOR WHICH WAS ON THE EDGE OF THE TRENCH ABOVE HIM IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INJURY WAS THE RESULT OF THE USUAL AND ORDINARY DANGERS OF A CONSTRUCTION SITE AS OPPOSED TO A RISK CONTEMPLATED BY THE LABOR LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff was in a trench when he was struck by the bucket of an excavator which was on the edge of the trench above him:

Plaintiffs’ own submissions created a triable issue of fact concerning the manner in which the accident occurred … , specifically whether plaintiff was injured due to a risk contemplated by the statute or, alternatively, by ” ‘the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site’ ” … . …

… [T]he court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion with respect to liability on the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action insofar as it is premised upon alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-9.4 (c) and 23-9.5 (a). The issue of fact concerning the manner in which the accident occurred precludes a determination as a matter of law whether either of those regulations were violated … . Malvestuto v Town of Lancaster, 2022 NY Slip Op 00577, Fourth Dept 1-28-22

 

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