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THE OWNER OF THE OLD BRONX COURTHOUSE HAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION SEEKING AN EASEMENT BY NECESSITY OVER THE SIDEWALK/STREET ABUTTING THE COURTHOUSE, DESPITE THE “DEMAPPING” OF THE ABUTTING STREET AND THE CONVEYANCE OF THE “DEMAPPED” STREET TO THE DEFENDANT; THE ACTION IS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE IT SEEKS TO QUIET TITLE TO THE OWNER’S LAND (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, determined the plaintiff’s action claiming ownership of, or an easement over, the sidewalk/street area abutting plaintiff’s property (the old Bronx courthouse) was properly dismissed, with exception of the claim of an easement by necessity. The street abutting the courthouse had been “demapped” by the city and conveyed to defendants before plaintiff purchased the courthouse property. The deed description of the courthouse property was unambiguous and was not altered by a hand-drawn circle around the property on the recorded tax map. The action was not precluded by the statute of limitations because it is an action to quiet title to the plaintiff’s land:

… [W]here, like here, the owner is in possession, the right of action to remove a cloud on title is a continuous one accruing from day to day, and this right is not barred by the statute of limitations until the cloud is continued without interruption for a length of time sufficient to effect a change of title as a matter of law … . “The reason for this rule is that while the owner in fee continues subject to an action, proceeding, or suit on the adverse claim, he or she has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his or her title, or to assert any superior equity in his or her favor”… . Accordingly, the owner may wait until his or her possession is disturbed, or his or her title is attacked, before taking steps to vindicate his or her right … . “The requirement of prompt action is imposed as a policy matter upon persons who would challenge title to property rather than those persons who seek to quiet title to their land” … . * * *

… [T]he deed contains no reference to the altered Tax Map, with the hand-drawn circle, purportedly intended to change the boundaries of the property. Nor is there any indication on the altered Tax Map of the circle’s purpose. If the parties wanted to change the boundaries of the property described in the deed and Current Tax Map to include a surrounding demapped street, they could easily have done so by making such notation on the deed and altered Tax Map. Liberty Sq. Realty Corp. v The Doe Fund, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 07082, First Dept 12-21-21

 

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