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THE CHILD IN THIS CUSTODY MATTER RESIDED IN ITALY, THEREFORE NEW YORK WAS NOT THE CHILD’S “HOME STATE” AND NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION; FATHER’S APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTE SERVICE IN ITALY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, reversing Supreme Court in this custody matter, determined: (1) New York was not the child’s “home state” because the child had resided in Italy for the 10 months before the action was commenced (therefore New York did not have jurisdiction): and (2) father’s application for substitute service in Italy should not have been granted because he did not make the required showing of the “impracticality” of the method of service required by the Hague Convention:

Applying the proper standard set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 76 (1) (a), it is incontrovertible that Italy, not New York, is the child’s home state. The child moved to Italy with the wife in July 2019 in accordance with the separation and settlement agreement, which clearly demonstrated the parties’ intention that the child live with the wife in Italy for a period of roughly three years. The child continued to live in Italy from July 2019 through this action’s commencement in June 2020. Although the child visited the husband in New York twice between July 2019 and February 2020, first for a period of about three weeks and later for a period of about six weeks, those periods merely constituted temporary absences that do not interrupt the six-month residency period required by the UCCJEA [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act] for home state status … . * * *

In support of his application for substituted service, the husband failed to come forward with sufficient proof demonstrating an actual effort to effectuate service upon the wife at her residence in Italy. The only proof submitted by the husband was an email — dated August 12, 2020, more than two months after commencement of the action — from an associate at a process service company that the husband’s counsel often used for service of process. The email estimated that service upon the wife in Italy in accordance with the Hague Convention would take roughly 18 to 20 weeks in total, which included “a few days” for Italian translation, 10 to 14 weeks for service and an additional two to four weeks for return of the proof of service. Although we are mindful that the COVID-19 pandemic remained an issue at the time of the August 2020 email, there was no indication in the email that the 18 to 20-week estimate was atypical or that the COVID-19 pandemic rendered service of process under the Hague Convention impracticable. Joseph II. v Luisa JJ., 2021 NY Slip Op 06586, Third Dept 11-24-21

 

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