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FAMILY COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES (DSS) TO COMMENCE A NEGLECT PROCEEDING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court does not have the authority to direct the Department of Social Services (DSS) to commence a neglect proceeding:

Neither DSS nor the attorney for the child disputes the ability of DSS to commence a neglect proceeding without leave of a court. They also do not dispute that Family Court, under Family Ct Act § 1034, may order DSS to conduct a child protective investigation and report its findings to the court. What is disputed is whether Family Court may order a child protective agency, such as DSS, to commence a neglect proceeding against a parent. …

“Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction that cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute” … . The relevant statute provides that a proceeding under Family Ct Act article 10 may be “originate[d]” either by “a child protective agency” or “a person on the court’s direction” (Family Ct Act § 1032 [a], [b]). In view of the express terms of the statute, Family Court has the authority to direct the commencement of a Family Ct Act article 10 proceeding. That authority, however, is limited to directing only a “person” to do so … — which DSS is not. Matter of Donald QQ. v Stephanie RR., 2021 NY Slip Op 05760, Third Dept 10-21-21

 

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