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A LATE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON THE MERITS ABSENT GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DELAY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ late motion for summary judgment should not have been considered on the merits:

CPLR 3212(a) provides, inter alia, that the court may set a date after which no motion for summary judgment may be made, and “[i]f no such date is set by the court, such motion shall be made no later than one hundred twenty days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown.” “‘[G]ood cause’ in CPLR 3212(a) requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion” … .

Here, the plaintiffs’ motion was, in effect, for summary judgment. The plaintiffs do not dispute that they did not file their motion within the period specified by CPLR 3212(a), and no good cause for the delay was shown. Thus, the Supreme Court erred in considering the motion on the merits … , and should have denied the motion. Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 05687, Second Dept 10-20-21

 

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ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE THE GUILTY PLEA MAY HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS HE WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS POSSIBLE; MATTER SENT BACK TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE THE PLEA (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE PETITIONERS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE OPERATION OF A CONCRETE PLANT WOULD CAUSE INJURIES TO THEM DIFFERENT FROM THOSE SUFFERED BY THE PUBLIC AT LARGE; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DETERMINED PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE RENOVATION AND OPERATION OF THE PLANT (SECOND DEPT).
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THE 90-DAY DEMAND REQUIRED BY CPLR 3216 WAS NOT PROVIDED BY THE COURT’S ORDER; THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO THE ACTIVE CALENDAR WITHOUT A SHOWING OF MERIT; THE ISSUE, FIRST RAISED ON APPEAL, WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND DEPT).
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