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THE MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW (CPLR 4401) FINDING THE NYC HOUSING AUTHORITY LIABLE FOR A BEDBUG INFESTATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion for a judgment as a matter law (CPLR 4401), finding the NYC Housing Authority (NYCHA) liable for a bedbug infestation of plaintiffs’ apartments, should not have been granted:

A motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 should not be granted unless, affording the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no rational process by which the jury could find for the nonmovant against the moving party … . A court considering a motion for a directed verdict “must not ‘engage in a weighing of the evidence,’ nor may it direct a verdict where ‘the facts are in dispute, or where different inferences may be drawn or the credibility of witnesses is in question'” … .

… [T]he evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to NYCHA, did not establish that there is no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of NYCHA … . The evidence included the plaintiffs’ testimony, as well as the parties’ competing expert testimony regarding the appropriate protocols for the treatment of a bedbug infestation and competing conclusions by the expert witnesses as to whether NYCHA’s bedbug eradication efforts were appropriate. Although a landlord’s violation of a municipal ordinance, including, as relevant here, Administrative Code of the City of New York §§ 27-2017 and 27-2018, may constitute some evidence of negligence for the jury to take into account, it does not constitute negligence per se … . Aponte v New York City Hous. Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 05114, Second Dept 9-29-21

 

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