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NEITHER PARTY WAS THE “PREVAILING PARTY” IN THIS DISPUTE OVER THE CARE OF THE PARTIES’ INCAPACITATED FATHER; THEREFORE NEITHER PARTY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined neither party in this dispute over care for an incapacitated person (the parties’ father) was a “prevailing party” and therefore neither of the two sons, Michael and Stephen, was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees:

Following an evidentiary hearing, … the Supreme Court denied Michael’s request to remove Stephen as Milton’s [father’s] attorney-in-fact and health care agent. However, the court determined that Stephen breached the settlement agreement by refusing to mediate. The court also granted that branch of Michael’s motion which was for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the settlement agreement’s fee shifting provision. …

 “Under the general rule, attorney’s fees are incidents of litigation and a prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties, statute or court rule” … . “‘[O]nly a prevailing party is entitled to recover an attorney’s fee’ and ‘[t]o be considered a prevailing party, a party must be successful with respect to the central relief sought'” … . “Such a determination requires an initial consideration of the true scope of the dispute litigated, followed by a comparison of what was achieved within that scope” … . Matter of Milton R., 2021 NY Slip Op 04975, Second Dept 9-15-21

 

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GENERAL CRITERIA FOR DENYING, WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING, A MOTION TO VACATE... THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MEET THE 90-DAY-NOTICE...