You are here: / / THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE...

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE ITS OWN DETERMINATION TO APPORTION SOME OF CLAIMANT’S DISABILITY TO A 1976 INJURY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Worker’s Compensation Board, determined the Board did not have sufficient evidence to determine the extent to which a 1976 injury accounted for some of claimant’s disability:

We recognize that the Board’s medical guidelines “provide ‘useful criteria’ and the Board makes the ultimate determination of a claimant’s degree of disability, but that determination must be supported by substantial evidence” … . Moreover, “although the Board may reject medical evidence as incredible or insufficient, it may not fashion its own medical opinion” … . Here, there are no operative or pathological reports from any surgeries related to the 1976 injury in the record. Nor is there any medical evidence regarding the degree of disability, if any, that had resulted from the 1976 injury and/or surgery and the record reflects that claimant was fully employed with no restrictions at the time of the 2016 injury. Further, even assuming, without deciding, that an evaluation of the 1976 injury under the 1996 guidelines is appropriate for the purposes of determining whether that injury would have resulted in an SLU [schedule loss of use] award, there is no medical opinion that the 1976 injury would have resulted in an SLU award at the time of the injury or under the subsequently published 1996 guidelines. Matter of Hughes v Mid Hudson Psychiatric Ctr., 2021 NY Slip Op 04939, Third Dep 9-2-21

 

You might also like
DESPITE THE DRIVER’S FAILURE TO USE A TURN SIGNAL AS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON THE GROUND THE STOP WAS ACTUALLY BASED UPON RACIAL PROFILING; IN THE FIRST DEPARTMENT THE “TURN SIGNAL” GROUND FOR THE STOP WOULD BE ENOUGH, EVEN IF THE STOP WAS ACTUALLY MOTIVATED BY DISCRIMINATION; NOT SO IN THE THIRD DEPARTMENT (THIRD DEPT).
THE INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUDED COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY INTENDED OR EXPECTED BY THE INSURED; HERE THE INSURED UNINTENTIONALLY STRUCK COLE, WHO WAS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK UP A FIGHT BETWEEN THE INSURED AND A THIRD PERSON; BECAUSE THE INJURY TO COLE WAS UNINTENDED, THE INSURER WAS REQUIRED TO DEFEND THE INSURED IN COLE’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTION AGAINST THE INSURED (THIRD DEPT). ​
PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE REPRESENTED DEFENDANT AND THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).
FATHER’S EXCUSE FOR NOT APPEARING (HE OVERSLEPT) WAS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND FATHER DEMONSTRATED A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THE GRANDPARENTS’ PETITION FOR CUSTODY OF THE CHILD; DEFAULT CUSTODY ORDER VACATED AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT).
AN AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE LAW REQUIRES UTILITY COMPANIES TO COMPENSATE CUSTOMERS FOR STORM-OUTAGE-RELATED LOSSES WHERE THE OUTAGE IS FOR 72 HOURS OR MORE AND PROHIBITS UTILITIES FROM RECOVERING THOSE COSTS FROM RATEPAYERS (THIRD DEPT).
CHILD’S TESTIMONY ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE NOT CORROBORATED, SEXUAL ABUSE ADJUDICATION REVERSED.
PLAINTIFF’S “INVOLUNTARY RESIGNATION,” HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND RETALIATION ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).
THE BUILT-IN WATER HEATER WAS A “STRUCTURE” AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN “REPAIR” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240(1); A SHELF ROUTINELY USED AS A PLATFORM TO ACCESS THE BUILT-IN WATER HEATER COULD CONSTITUTE A DANGEROUS CONDITION WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 200 (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP; THE 911... THE EVIDENCE OF ALTERCATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CHILDREN AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION...