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You are here: Home1 / Municipal Law2 / IN A SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, WHERE THE VILLAGE CODE REQUIRES WRITTEN...
Municipal Law, Negligence

IN A SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, WHERE THE VILLAGE CODE REQUIRES WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE DEFECT BE GIVEN TO THE VILLAGE CLERK AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO LIABILITY, PROOF THAT WRITTEN NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO SOME OTHER VILLAGE OFFICER OR ENTITY WILL NOT DEFEAT THE VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the village’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should have been granted. The village code provided the village would not be liable unless written notice of the condition had been given to the village clerk. Here the notice was apparently given to another village officer or body:

Village Code § 59-l provides that “[n]o civil actions shall be maintained against the Village for damages or injuries to persons or property sustained” from a defect in Village property “unless written notice” of the defect “was actually given to the Village Clerk and there was a failure or neglect within a reasonable time after the receipt of such written notice to repair or remove the defect.” Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice law, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition which comes within the ambit of the law unless it has received prior written notice of the alleged defect or dangerous condition pursuant to the terms of the prior written notice law, or an exception to the prior written notice requirement applies … .

Here, the Village established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, inter alia, an affidavit from the Village Clerk, who averred that she had conducted a search of the records contained in the Office of the Village Clerk and that there was no prior written notice of the alleged defective condition that caused the injured plaintiff’s accident.

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the Village Clerk had received prior written notice of the alleged defective condition. Evidence that written notice may have been provided to another Village officer or body did not give rise to a triable issue of fact, since Village Code § 59-l requires that written notice be actually given to the Village Clerk … . Hiller v Village of Warwick, 21 NY Slip Op 04704, Second Dept 8-18-21

 

August 18, 2021
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-08-18 13:20:122021-08-22 13:35:32IN A SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, WHERE THE VILLAGE CODE REQUIRES WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE DEFECT BE GIVEN TO THE VILLAGE CLERK AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO LIABILITY, PROOF THAT WRITTEN NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO SOME OTHER VILLAGE OFFICER OR ENTITY WILL NOT DEFEAT THE VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
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