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THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW PROVISION WHICH REQUIRES SIGNALING FOR 100 FEET BEFORE MAKING A TURN, EVEN THOUGH THE TRUCK WHICH MADE THE TURN WAS STOPPED AT A TRAFFIC LIGHT; DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS TRUCK-BICYCLE ACCIDENT CASE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Barros, overruling a City Court decision, reversing the jury verdict in this truck-bicycle traffic accident case, determined the jury should have been instructed on the Vehicle and Traffic Law provision requiring that a turn signal be activated for 100 feet before turning. The truck was at a stop light and plaintiff testified the truck’s turn signal was not on when she pulled up to the stop light next to the truck. When she started riding straight through the intersection, the truck allegedly made a right turn and ran over her. The driver (Murphy) testified he put his signal on and then made the turn. The trial court instructed the jury on the Vehicle and Traffic Law provision which applies to parked cars and which does not have the “100-foot” signaling requirement. The Second Department found that the truck was not “parked” within the meaning of that provision:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b) provides that “[a] signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Under Vehicle and Traffic § 1163(a), Murphy was required to signal his intention to turn right at the subject intersection. Thus, since a signal of intention to turn was required, the clear and unambiguous words used in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b) also required Murphy to give such signal “continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet” that he traveled before making the turn. The provision makes no exception for vehicles that are stopped at a red traffic light … .

… Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(d), which applies … to vehicles moving from a parked position, and which does not require a vehicle to signal its turn 100 feet before making it, is inapplicable. Murphy’s truck was not parked within the meaning of “park or parking” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 129. Rather, it was stopped at a red light … . To the extent that People v Brandt (60 Misc 3d 956, 961 [Poughkeepsie City Ct]) holds otherwise, we overrule it.

The precise and specific duty established in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(b) bore directly on the facts to which the parties testified, and, therefore, the Supreme Court erred in refusing to give that charge … . The statute establishes a standard of care, the unexcused violation of which is negligence per se … .  Moore v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 04483, Second Dept 7-21-21

 

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